Two members of a criminal gang are arrested and imprisoned. Each prisoner is in solitary confinement with no means of communicating with the other. The prosecutors lack sufficient evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge, but they have enough to convict both on a lesser charge. Simultaneously, the prosecutors offer each prisoner a bargain.
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Rows:
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Columns:
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|
|---|---|---|
| Confess | Silent | |
| Confess |
,
Nash Equilibrium
|
,
Nash Equilibrium
|
| Silent |
,
Nash Equilibrium
|
,
Nash Equilibrium
|
Blue: Player A Payoff, Red: Player B Payoff.
Cells highlighted in Green represent a Pure Nash Equilibrium.
When no pure Nash equilibrium exists, players randomize their strategies to make the opponent indifferent. We calculate p and q by equating expected utilities.
Algebraic Formulas and Substitution:
q (Probability B Left):
q = (A22 - A12) / (A11 - A12 - A21 + A22)
q = ( - ) / ( - - + )
p (Probability A Top):
p = (B22 - B21) / (B11 - B21 - B12 + B22)
p = ( - ) / ( - - + )
Values in the matrix represent the utility or benefit each player receives. A scale of -10 to 10 has been selected to represent preference intensity:
Cells highlighted in green indicate a Nash Equilibrium. This means that, at that point, neither player has incentives to unilaterally change their strategy. If a player changes their decision while the other maintains theirs, their payoff would decrease or not improve. It is the "stable" state of the game where both strategies coincide optimally.