Two individuals go out on a hunt. Each can individually choose to hunt a stag or hunt a hare. Each individual must choose an action without knowing the choice of the other. If an individual hunts a stag, they must have the cooperation of their partner in order to succeed. An individual can get a hare by himself, but a hare is worth less than a stag.
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Rows:
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Columns:
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|---|---|---|
| Stag | Hare | |
| Stag |
,
Nash Equilibrium
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,
Nash Equilibrium
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| Hare |
,
Nash Equilibrium
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,
Nash Equilibrium
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Blue: Player A Payoff, Red: Player B Payoff.
Cells highlighted in Green represent a Pure Nash Equilibrium.
When no pure Nash equilibrium exists, players randomize their strategies to make the opponent indifferent. We calculate p and q by equating expected utilities.
Algebraic Formulas and Substitution:
q (Probability B Left):
q = (A22 - A12) / (A11 - A12 - A21 + A22)
q = ( - ) / ( - - + )
p (Probability A Top):
p = (B22 - B21) / (B11 - B21 - B12 + B22)
p = ( - ) / ( - - + )
Values in the matrix represent the utility or benefit each player receives. A scale of -10 to 10 has been selected to represent preference intensity:
Cells highlighted in green indicate a Nash Equilibrium. This means that, at that point, neither player has incentives to unilaterally change their strategy. If a player changes their decision while the other maintains theirs, their payoff would decrease or not improve. It is the "stable" state of the game where both strategies coincide optimally.